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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND TO  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
REGARDING THE REVISION OF  THE MERGER REGULATION 
Introduction 
Council  Regulation 4064/89  on  the  control  of concen\rations between undertakings 
("the Merger Regulation") was adopted on 21  December 1989 and entered into force 
on  21  September 1990.  The Merger Regulation  applies to  all  concentrations having 
a Community dimension defined on the basis of the annual turnover of the companies 
concerned. 
The Commission first  examined the  functioning  of the  Merger Regulation  in  1993. 
That exercise was prompted by  the legal  obligation to review the turnover thresholds 
under Article  1 and  the  case referral  rules under Articles 9 and  22.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  took  the  opportunity  to  examine the  operation  of the  Regulation  as  a 
whole,  in  order to  identify other areas in  which improvements could be made. 
The result of the  1993  exercise was  a Report from  the  Commission to  the  Council' 
which concluded that there were strong arguments in favour of a threshold reduction 
However,  the  Commission  considered  that  it  would  be  prudent  to  gain  further 
experience of the operation of the Merger Regulation  and  of the  impact of national 
merger control  policies before making any  formal  proposal  for  revision.  It  therefore 
invited the Council  to  postpone the review of the thresholds until  the end  of 1996 at 
the latest.  The Council  endorsed  these conclusions in  September  1993 
Pursuant to the commitment made to the Council in  1993, the Commission carried out 
an  extensive review of the  Merger Regulation  in  the  light of the  experience gained 
from  the application of the Regulation and on the basis of economic and other relevant 
data  and  information.  Th~ Commission  also  conducted  a survey  of Member States, 
companies, industry associations and advisers during the summer and autumn of 1995, 
to seek their views as to aTovision of the Regulation. Finally the European Parliament 
and  the  Ecot~omic and  Social  Committee were invited to  express their opinion.  ·.-
Based  on  the results  of the survey,  the  Commission  adopted  a Green  Paper on  the 
Review of the  Regulation  on  31  January  of this  year
1
.  The  Green  Paper  principally 
examined whether the turnover thresholds,  above which concentrations are notifiable 
to  the  Commission,  should  be  revised.  It  also  identified  other  areas  where 
improvements could be  made and  presented a series of options for  discussion . 
.. 
Following the a·doption. of the G.reen  Paper, the Commission launched a con-.ultaucn 
of Member States, industry associations,  companies and other interested parties.  The 
Council,  the  European Parliament and  the  Economic and  Social  Committee and  the 
Committee of the Regions were also invited  to express their opinion 
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i  The  review showed that Community merger control  is  widely  regarded as a success. 
~evertheless, it identified a number of weaknesses in the present system,  not only in 
relation  to  thresholds,  but  also  in  relation  to  some  other  aspects  of the  Merger 
Regulation. 
11.  The main issues to be addressed 
"'  :\s the  Commission  already  stated  in  the  Green  Paper,  in  line  with  the  notion  of 
subsidiarity, concentrations with significant cross-border effects within the Community 
~hould be examined at Community level, in view of the objectives to be attained and 
the means available to the Community and the Member States. The application of the 
"une-stop shop"  principle of the Merger Regulation to such concentrations simplifies 
administrative procedures and  creates a level playing field by ensuring that the same 
notification  requirements,  procedure and  legal  standard apply . 
. \t present, in  order for the Merger Regulation to apply, the combined turnover of the 
comp~nies involved in  a concentration must exceed ECU 5 billion worldwide and the 
Community turnover of each of at least two of those companies must exceed ECU 250 
m  iII ion  However, an important number of  concentrations with significant cross-border 
ct"fccts covcri ng  a variety of economic sectors currently fall  below these high levels. 
!his situation  is  not  in  line  with  subsidiarity,  it  distorts the  level  playing field  and 
·kprin:s  companies  that  are  involved  in  cross-border  merger  activities  from  the 
,1J vantages of the  "one-stop shop" 
! ''  I he  rcvie\v also addressed the issue of multiple notification of concentrations below 
the  tlm:slwlds  Since  1989, when the  ~1erger Regulation was adopted, many Member 
\utes  have  introduced  national  systems  of merger  control.  As  a  result,  the  total 
number uf potential jurisdictions within the EEA is now thirteen- fourteen,  when the 
Dutch  legislation comes into force-, in  eight of which notification is obligatory. This 
prolifer:1tion  of n:1tion:1l  systems  means  that  cross-border  mergers  and  acquisitions 
hlling  oubide  the  scope  of the  Merger  Regulation  are  now  likely  to  qualify  for 
cxJmination by a number ofnational authorities. Each ofthese national authorities will 
.1pply  its  own different procedure and  criteria for the appreciation of the transaction. 
\lultiple national  filings  thus  increase uncertainty,  effort and  cost for  business,  and 
may lead  to  conflicting decisions 
\ I  In some cases,  concentrations with  significant cross-border effects may  be excluded 
!·rum  th~.:  Merger Regulation, because the companies involved realise more--than two-
thirds  of their  Community-wide turnover  within  one  and  the  same Member  State. 
llow~.:ver, the Commission considers that on balance the two-thirds rule is appropriate, 
because, if it  were to be deleted or modified, cases with mainly national impact would 
ltkely  be caught 
r\part from  the thresholds,  the  main  other areas where improvements should be made 
arc  the  following 
(  11  The  treatment  of concentrative  and  cooperative  full-function  joint ventures 
under different  regimes  is  considered  unsatisfactory,  especially to  the extent 
that  it  leads to  differences  in  the  deadlines for  assessment and  the degree of legal  certainty afforded to companies. 
(ii)  Although the current system  for  the  referral  of concentrations to  and  from 
Member States  under Articles 9  and  22  of the Regulation  is  on  the  whole: 
regarded  as  sastifactory,  it  is  considered  that  some  aspects  of the  referral 
procedures could be improved or clarified. 
(iii)  Banking income as the basis for calculating turnover for credit and  financial 
institutions would more accuratly reflect the reafities of the banking sector that 
an assets-based criterion. 
(iv)  A number of "house-keeping" amendments should be made to perfect or clarify 
the text of the Regulation. 
III.  Proposed amendments 
13.  The Commission considers that it is now appropriate to propose amendments that will 
address  the above-mentioned  shortcomings and  will  thus improve the  operation  nf 
merger control  in  the European Community. 
14.  The proposed amendments fall  within one of the following categories. 
modifications giving effect to  the principles set out in  Articles 85  and  8c)  t·t 
the Treaty (Article 87 of the Treaty); 
modifications necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community and for which the Treaty has 
not  provided the necessary powers (Article 235 of the Treaty), 
an  appropriate  adaptation  of the  turnover  thresholds,  in  the  light  of the 
experience  gained  in  the  application  of the  Merger  Regulation  (Articll'  l. 
paragraph 3 of the Merger Regulation). 
15  Article  1,  paragraph 3 of the Merger Regulation provides that the thresholds will  be 
reviewed  by  the  Council  acting  by  a  qualified  majority  on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission. A different procedure is envisaged by Articles 235 and 87 of the Treatv, 
on  which all  other proposed amendments will  be based - for instance. under  Artie!~: 
235 of the Treaty, the Council must act unanimously. 
16  In  view  of these  differences,  the  Commission  has  decided  to  make  two  separate 
proposals:  -the  first  proposal  relates  to  the  threshold  reduction,  including  the 
mechanism for multiple national  filings,  and is based exclusively on Article  I  (3) of 
the Merger Regulation;  the  second  proposal  relates  to  other aspects of the Merger 
Regulation and is  based on Articles 235 and 87  of the Treaty. The present docun1c; · 
relating  to  both  proposals  is  transmitted  to  the  Council  and  to  the  European 
Parliament, with a view to their consideration as a whole. 
A.  The Commission proposal  based on Article  1 (3) of the Merger Regulation 17.  The Commission concluded  in  the Green Paper that the current levels of the world-
wide  and  the  Community  thresholds  should  be  reduced  in  order  to  ensure  that 
concentrations with significant cross-border effects would be controlled at Community 
level, in accordance with subsidiarity. Although it was difficult to establish the precise 
levels  of such  lower  thresholds,  it  appeared  that,  on  the  basis  of the  information 
available  at  that  time,  a world-wide threshold  of ECU 2 billion and  a Community 
threshold of ECU 100 million would allow most concentrations with significant cross-
border effects to  come under single Community jurisdiction. In  any case,  it appeared 
necessary to address the problem of multiple notification of concentrations below the 
current thresholds. 
18.  Following the consultation on the Green Paper, and in making concrete proposals that 
would  appropriately  address the jurisdictional  issues  under review,  the Commission 
decided to adopt a combined approach. This consists in a proposed threshold reduction 
to intermediate threshold levels of ECU 3 billion and ECU 150 million. It appears that 
there  is  broader  agreement  that  these  levels  would  cover most  concentrations  with 
significant  cross-border  effects.  Between  these  levels  and  the  initially  mentioned 
thresholds of ECU 2 billion and  100  million,  it is  still  important to address the issue 
of multiple  national  filings.  This  would  increase  administrative  efficiency  in  the 
application of the  merger rules and  would bring within the scope of the Regulation, 
in  line  with  subsidiarity,  operations  which  would,  as  a general  rule,  likely  impact 
market  structure over a geographic  area  exceeding the  borders of a single Member 
State. 
I 9  In line with the above, the Commission proposes a reduction of the current world-wide 
and  Community  thresholds  to  ECU  3 billion  and  ECU  150  million,  while,  for  the 
reasons  explained  above,  the  2/3  rule  remains  unchanged  (Article  1,  paragraph  2). 
Between these thresholds and lower thresholds of ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million, 
only concentrations that qualify for examination in at least three Member States of the 
Community would  also come within  the exclusive competence of the Commission. 
/he mechanism {or  multiple national filings 
20  The  proposed  mechanism  for  dealing with  multiple national  filings  is  based  on  the 
following  elements: 
It  would  apply  to  all  concentrations  that:  (i)  fall  between  the  above-mentioned 
intermediate and  lower thresholds and do not meet the two-thirds rule; and (ii) qualify 
for  exam-ination,  whether on  an  obligatory or a voluntary basis,  in  at least 3 Member 
States  of the  European  Community.  The  inclusion  of voluntary  systems of merger 
control  is  justified,  because:  (i)  the  cross-border  character  of a  transaction  that  is 
indicated,  as  a general  rule,  by  the  application of three or more national  provisions 
does not depend on the obligatory or voluntary character of notification; and (ii) even 
where notification is  voluntary,  the  transaction can  still  be controlled by  the national 
authority, with the result that in  practice the parties tend to notify, for reasons of legal 
certainty.  As  to  the  number  of national  laws  that  must  be  applicable,  although  a 
transaction  coming  within  the  jurisdiction  of two  national  systems  is,  generally 
speaking,  likely  to  have  cross-border elements,  bilateral  co-ordination  between  the 
national  authorities concerned  should  alleviate to  a large extent the  complexities of 
-
) multiple notification. In  contrast, where three or more national  systems are involved, 
coordination is  clearly not an  effective solution. 
If these  requirements  are  met,  a  concentration  would  fall  within  the  exclusive 
competence of the European Commission. 
The  concentration  would  be  deemed  to  qualify  for  examination  under the  national 
systems  mentioned  by  the  parties  in  the  notification,  unless  the  Member  States 
concerned  inform  the  Commission  that this  is  not  the case within  two  weeks  from 
receipt of all  relevant facts.  The Commission would only verify whether and how the 
Member States concerned have  reacted  within  the two weeks,  and  would not check 
itself whether  the  national  thresholds  have  actually  been  met.  Phase  1 would  be 
extended by two weeks. 
21.  In  order to introduce the  new  procedure for  multiple national  filings,  the following 
Articles  of the  Regulation  will  be  amended:  Article  1 (new  paragraphs  3  and  4 
extending  the  notion  of a  concentration  with  a  Community  dimension  to  those 
concentrations qualifying for examination in at least 3 Member States of the European 
Community);  new article 6a (non-opposition procedure relating to the application of 
the  national  merger control provisions);  Article 9 (2) (extension of the period within 
which  a .l\-'lember  State  may  make  a request  for  referral  by  two  weeks);  Article  l 0 
(new paragraph providing for an  extension of Phase  1 by  two weeks). 
22.  Following the  adoption  of the  Commission proposal  by  the Council, certain changes 
would  also  have  to  be  made  to  the  current  Implementing Regulation  (Commission 
Regulation  No.  3384/94).  For instance,  the  procedural  details of notification  would 
have  to  be  specified,  including  the  circumstances  in  which  the  Commission  can 
declare  a  notification  incomplete,  where  the  information  supplied  by  the  parties  is 
insufficient  for  the  Member  States  to  determine  the  application  of their  national 
merger control  provisions. 
fL._  The Commission  proposal  based  on  Articles 235  and  87  of the Treaty 
Re1•iew  of  the  thresholds 
23.  In  order to ensure that concentrations with significant cross-border effects continue to 
be  covered  by  Community  merger  control,  it  is  provided  that  the  thresholds 
establishing  the  Community  dimension  of concentrations  can  be  adjusted  by  the 
Council acting by  a qualified majority on a proposal by the Commission (new Article 
I,  paragraph 5). 
Referral provisions 
24.  Article 9 is modified, so as to provide th~t where a distinct market within the territory 
of a Member State does  not constitute a substantial  part of the common market,  the 
request for referral by this Member State must only demonstrate that the concentration 
affects such a market.  In contrast, no proof of threat to create or strengthen dominance 
will  be required. This change is justified by the fact that the Commission can prohibit 
a concentration only if it creates or strengthens dominance in  a substantial part of the common market.  In  addition,  it  is  made clear in  the text of Article 9 that a referral 
may  concern the whole or part of a case,  depending on  the extent to  which the case 
affects a distinct market,  be it  a substantial  part of the common market or not. 
25.  As  to  Article 22,  two  main  changes are  proposed:  (i) the  suspension  provisions of 
Article 7 will apply to concentrations that form  the object of an  Article 22 request, to 
the extent that they  have not been put into effect on  the day the parties are informed 
by  the  Commission that such  a request has been  made;  and (ii) it is  made clear that 
two or more Member States can make a joint referral where apprc.priate, for instance 
in cases where dominance would be created or strenghtened in an area extending over 
their territories. 
Joint ventures 
In  orJer  to  improve  the  treatment  of cooperative  full-function  joint ventures,  the 
concept of concentration under Article 3 of the  Merger Regulation is  enlarged so as 
to include all  full-function joint ventures. Cooperative full-function joint ventures are 
thus brought within the scope and  procedure of the Regu•ation.  In  substantive terms, 
~i nee  Cl1l1pcrative  full-function  joint  ventures  are  treated  as  concentrations,  the 
dominance test  of Article  2 of the  Regulation  will,  in  principle,  apply.  In  addition, 
Arti(k  .2  mll  be  modified  so  as  to  give  the  Commission  the  possibility  to  apply, 
\\ithin the  procedure of the  Merger Regulation,  the  criteria of Article 85  (1) and  (3) 
of the Treaty, where necessary, that is  to  the cxt...:nt  that the joint venture leads to the 
coordination of the competiti\e behaviour of companies that remain independent This 
llld\"  be  the  case,  for  instance where t\vo  or  more  parent companies remain  active in 
the  market  of the joint venture,  or  where the  creation  of the joint venture gives rise 
to the cuurJinatiun of the  p~1rcnts' acti\·ities in  upstream, downstream or neighbouring 
market-. 
l h  1 s solution  presents clear ad\ ant ages com pared  to the current situation,  because. 
all  full-function  joint  ventures  \viii  be  examined  within  the  procedure  and 
deadlines of the  Merger Regulation,; 
only one tina!  decision will  be adopted based on a global assessment of the all 
aspects of the  case; 
the  complexities inherent  in  the  distinction  between cooperative full-function 
~llld  concentratin~ joint ventures will  be  eliminated. 
l
1nder  the  proposal,  the  assessment of the  concentrative and  coordination aspects of 
:dl  full-function joint ventures above the  Regulation  thresholds \vould fall  within the 
cxclusi\·e competence of the Commission.  The concentrative aspects of full-function 
jl1int  ventures below the thresholds would  fall  within the competence of the Member 
States  :\s to  the coordination aspects of such joint ventures,  the status quo would be 
r11:1int·,;r,,,rl  R,• .. riiation  No  17  would  remain applicable- Article 22,  paragraph 2 of 
lllc·  l,L, ,,:  ·  1.::.  amended  accordingly  - and  would  Live  the  Commission  the 
J1USsibility  to  apply  Article  85  (I) and  (3),  while  Member  States  would  be  able to 
appl~· their relevant  national  lcnvs  and/or  85  (I) -but  not  85  (3).  In  this context,  t1e 
l 'ommission \Viii  declare that  it  will  not actively  seek to  apply  Regulation  No.  17  to 
tht: coordination aspects of such joint ventures, but would leave, to the extent possible, 
the  asst:ssment of those clements to  the  Member States. 29.  As  stated  above,  a  single  decision  will  be  adopted  in  all  cases  declaring  the 
concentration compatible or incompatible with the common market. To the extent that 
Article 85  (1) and (3) apply to a full-function joint venture, the Commission deeision 
will grant an exemption for the lifetime of the joint venture. However,  it is provided 
that  the  Commission  will  have  the  possibility  to  revoke  its  decision,  as  far  as,  in 
exceptional  cases,  over  time  the  market  position  of  the  parent  companies  is 
strengthened in  a way  that the coordination of their competitive behaviour no longer 
complies  with  the  basic  requirement  of  Article  85  (3)b,  i.e.  no  possibility  of 
eliminating competition. This is done by inserting ar. additional ground for revocation 
under Articles 6 and  8 (5) of the Regulation. 
Bankinf{ income and "house  keeping" amendments 
30.  Article  5  (3)  a  is  modified,  so  as  to  provide  that  banking  income  as  defined  in 
Directive 86/63 5/EEC  will  be used  as  a basis for  calculating the  turnover of credit 
and  financial  institutions.  This detinition, which  corresponds to  gross as  opposed to 
net  banking  income,  is  consistent  with  the  Commission's  general  approach  for 
calculating turnover. Moreover, in order to simplify the Commission's approach, it has 
been  considered  appropriate  to  provide  that  the  geographic  allocation  of turnover 
should be based on  the location of the branch or division making the loan or providing 
the service 
31.  The  "house  keeping"  amendments  are  intended  to  perfect  or clarify  the  text of the 
Regulation  These are  the  following: 
It  has  been  considered  appropriate  to  clarify  the  situation  with  regard  to  first  phase 
commitments  Article 6 is  thus  modified  to  provide the Commission with an  express 
legal  basis  for  accepting  (new  paragraph  2)  and  enforcing  (new  paragraph  3) 
commitments  in  the first  phase  of proceedings.  Article  10  extends the first  phase to 
six  weeks  in  cases where commitments are  offered by  the  parties,  in  order to  allow 
effective  consultation  of Member  States  and  third  parties.  The  possibility  to  adopt 
implementing provisions relating to  phase  I commitments is provided in  Article 23J 
Ancillary  restrictions in  first  phase  by  analogy to  phase 2,  an  express provision for 
such  restraints is  made  by  adding a second  indent to  Article 6 (1) (b). 
Suspension  of concentrations:  in  order  to  harmonise  the  duration  of suspension  of 
concentrations with  the duration  of the  first  phase,  Article 7 (1)  is  modified so as  to 
extend the duration of suspension up  to  the adoption of a final  decision.  Paragraph 4 
is  modified  to give the  Commission  more  flexibility  in  deciding whether or not  to 
grant a derogation from  the  suspension  obligations in  appropriate cases. 
Article  10(4)  is  modified  so  as  to  to  provide  that  first  phase  proceedings  can  be 
The Colllnussion for instance proposes to  introduce a  time-limit of three weeks from the date 
of' receipt of the  notification for the acceptance of first phase commitments, so as to allow time 
for consultation of Member States and  third parties. suspended in the same exceptional circumstances in  which second phase -Proceedings 
are  suspended. 
A number of areas where the adoption of implementing provisions by the Commission 
is required are added to  Article 23,  namely  time limits pursuant to Articles 7,  9 and 
22,  as  well  as  the  procedure  and  time  limits  for  submitting  modifications  to  the 
original  concentration plan. 
IV.  Impact on Commission resources 
32.  The Commission has stated in  its Green Paper that the increase in workload resulting 
from  a threshold reduction and other proposed amendments to the Regulation should 
not  reduce quality and efficiency.  In  order to meet these concerns, an  estimate of the 
additional  resources needed under each of the two  proposals has been made. 
V.  Impact  of the  Commission  proposals  on  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs) 
33.  SMEs,  as  defined  by  the  Commission Recommendation  c~ 3 April  1996~. would not 
meet  the  proposed  10\ver  thresholds.  As  a result,  they  would  not  be  affected  by  the 
proposed  amendments, except in  the  rather exceptional  case where a joint venture is 
jointly controlled by  a number of companies,  one of which  is  a SME.  In  such  cases, 
Sl\1Es  would  benefit  from  the  advat'tages of the Community  "one-stop shop". 
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COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
no....  of .... 
amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
THE  cn.JtC ll Of  THE  EUROPEAN  UN I oiH , 
Having regard to Article 1 (3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, 
Having regard to the proposal from  the Commission, 
Whereas  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  provides  that  the  Council  acting  by  a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission must review the thresholds establishing 
the Community dimension of a concentration, in  the light of the experience gained from the 
application of the Regulation; 
Whereas,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  the  thresholds  triggering 
Community merger control  should be set at a level at which concentrations are more likely 
to have significant cross-border effects than  a  mainly  national  impact;  whereas leaving to 
Member States  the  competence  to  control  concentrations  having  significant  cross-border 
effects would not ensure a "one-stop shop"  system and would not allow for an appreciation 
of the competition impact of concentrations on the Community as a whole; 
Whereas, concentrations with significant cross-border effects below the thresholds may qualify 
for  examination under a  number of national jurisdictions; whereas national  merger control 
systems within the Community are not sufficiently harmonized at present; 
Whereas as a general rule, the impact of a concentration subject to multiple national control 
would  go  beyond  the  borders of any  one Member State;  whereas,  in  addition,  multiple 
notification of the same transaction increases legal uncertainty, effort and cost for companies 
and may J·ead  to conflicting assessments; whereas in these cases the exclusive application of 
Community merger control would increase administrative efficiency and would contribute to 
the creation of a level  playing field  across the Community; 
Whereas, the thresholds for the application of Community merger control should be adjusted 
in order to meet the above-mentioned objectives; whereas the current levels of the world-wide 
and Community thresholds should therefore be reduced; whereas, in addition, between these 
lower  levels  and  certain  base  levels,  the  Community  merger  rules  should  also  apply  to 
concentrations  that  would  otherwise  be  subject  to  multiple  national  control  within  the 
Community, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: ARTICLE 1
1 
Council  Regulation (EEC) No  4064/89 is  hereby  amended as  follows. 
1.  Article  1 
a)  Paragraph  I is  amended as  follows: 
"Without  prejudice  to  Article  22  this  Regulation  shall  apply  to  all 
concentrations with  a Community dimension as  defined in  paragraphs 2-4." 
b)  Paragraph 2 is  amended as  follows: 
"For  the  purposes  of this  Regulation,  a  concentration  has  a  Community 
dimension where  : 
(a)  the  combined  aggregate  worldwide  turnover  of all  the  undertakings 
concerned is  more than  ECU 3000 million; and 
(b)  the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at  least two of the 
undertakings concerned is  more than  ECU 150  million; 
uniess each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State." 
c)  Paragraph 3 is  replaced by  the following: 
"For the  purposes  of this  Regulation,  a concentration  within  the  meaning of 
Article  3 that  does  not  meet  the  thresholds  laid  down  in  paragraph  2 has  a 
Community dimension, where: 
(a)  the  combined  aggregate  world-wide  turnover  of all  the  undertakings 
concerned is  more than  ECU 2 000  million; 
(b)  the aggregate  ~ommunity-wide turnover of each of at  least two of the 
undertakings concerned is  more than  ECU  I 00 million;  and 
(c)  the concentration is deemed to qualify for examination in at least three 
Member  States  of  the  European  Community,  according  to  the 
thresholds  and/or  other  criteria  laid  down  by  the  relevant  national 
merger control  provisions; 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State." 
When this proposal makes reference to  Articles of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 
21  December  l'>8'J.  it  should be  read  in  conjunction not  only  with the  current text of this 
Regulation. but also \\ ith  Commission proposal  no ...  of .... d)  A new paragraph 4 is  added  after paragraph 3 reading: 
"For the purposes of paragraph 3 (c): 
(a)  a concentration  is  deemed  to  qualify  for  examination  under  national 
merger control  provisions,  whether such  examination can  be initiated 
on  the  basis  of a  notification  by  the  parties,  on  the  Member State's 
initiative or by  other means; 
(b)  in  cases  where  national  merger  control  provisions  contain  different 
thresholds for pre-merger and post-merger control, only the thresholds 
triggering pre-merger control  will  be taken  into account. 
2.  A new  Article 6a  entitled  "Procedure  for  multiple  national  filings"  is  inserted  after 
Article 6 reading: 
"I.  For the  purposes  of Article  I,  paragraph  3  (c),  the  information  required  to 
determine  the  application  of  national  merger  control  provisions  must  be 
contained  in  the  notification  pursuant to  Article  4.  The Commission  shall, 
without delay,  transmit  such  information to  the  competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned. 
2.  Where  a  Member  State  referred  to  in  the  notification  has  not  opposed  the 
application of its national merger control provisions within two weeks from the 
date it  receives  all  necessary  information,  the  concentration shall  be deemed 
to qualify for examination in  this Member State  Any such opposition must be 
reasoned  and  in  writing" 
3  In  Article 9,  the following text  is  added  at  the  end  of paragraph  2: 
''That period shall  be increased to five weeks where the Community dimension 
of a concentration is  determined  in  accordance with  Article  I,  paragraph 3" 
4.  In  Article  I  0,  a new  sub-paragraph  is  inserted  at  the  end  of paragraph  I reading 
"The  periods  referred  to  in  this  paragraph  shall  be  extended  by  two  weeks 
where  the  Community  dimension  of  a  concentration  is  determined  in 
accordance with  Article  I,  paragraph 3." 
5.  In  Article  23,  the  phrase  "the  procedure  applicable  to  cases  where the  Community 
dimension  of a concentration  is  determined  in  accordance with  Article  I,  paragraph 
3,"  is  inserted after the  phrase "and  other details  of notifications pursuant to  Article 
4,". 
ARTICLE 2 
This Regulation shall  enter into force  011 ARTICLE 3 
This Regulation shall not apply to any  concentration which was the subject of an agreement 
or announcement or where control was acquired within the meaning of Article 4 (I) before 
the date of  this Regulation's entry into force and it shall not in any circumstances apply to any 
concentration in  respect of which proceedings were initiated before that date by a Member 
State's authority with responsibility for competition. 
This Regulation shall be binding in  its entirety and directly applicable in all  Member States. FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
(Proposal  1) 
A financial  statement,  the  model  for  which  follows,  must  accompany  any  Commission 
proposal  or  communication  to  the  Council  that  is  likely  to  have  implications  for  the 
budget, including implications in terms of the number of posts (Article 3 of the Financial 
Regulation).  At least ten working days must normally be allowed for DG XIX's opinion 
and for the opinion of DG IX (on section  10 "Administrative expenditure").  An opinion 
will  be given only if all  the questions are answered. 
The same information,  updated  for  operations already  under way,  must be  supplied in 
support  of requests  for  appropriations  when  the  preliminary  draft  budget  _is  being 
prepared.  The  information  to  be  supplied  may  vary  in  certain  cases.  The  particular 
financial  statement to be used  in  such cases is specified in the annual  budgetary circular. 
The numbered sections must be completed.  The notes in  italics suggest various possible 
answers.  It  is  up  to  the  department  to  present  as  clearly  and  fully  as  possible  the 
information  it  is  submitting in  support  of its  request  for  appropriations  or  estimate of 
future  requirements.  The  notes  in  italics  should  therefore  be  deleted  when  the 
department's text  is  inserted. - 2 -
Financial statement 
1.  TITLE OF OPERATION:  Review of Council  Regulation  No 4064/89 on  the 
control of concentrations between undertakings 
2.  BUDGET HEADING(S) INVOLVED 
Part A (see section  1  0) 
3.  LEGAL BASIS:  Article  1(3) of Council  Regulation  No  4064/89 on  the control 
of concentrations between undertakings 
4.  DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: 
4.1  General  objective  to  extend  the  scope  of merger  control  applying  to 
undertakings ha·,ing.a Community dimension 
4 2  Period covered and  arrangements for  renewal. 
No time-limit 
5.  CLASSIFICATION OF EXPE;\IOITURF: OR REVENlfE 
5 I  :\'on-compulsory expenditure 
5 2  !\'on-differentiated appropriations 
5 3  Type of revenue involved 
6.  TYPI': OF l<.:XPENDITliRI': OR RI':VI':NUI': 
Administrative e\penditure (see section  10) 
\\'ill the proposed operation cause any  change in  the level of revenue')  If 
so.  \vhat  sort of change and  \vhat  type  of revenue is  involved? 
In  contrast  to  some  Member States  (Germany,  the  United  Kingdom),  the 
Commission has not  hithe110 charged any  registration fee or levied any  other type 
uf charge for notifications lodged by  tirms.  By  way of comparison, such fees and 
charges  amount  to  OM  12  000-15 000  (ECU 6 400-8 020)  in  Germany  and 
UKL  5 000-15 000 (ECU 6  I  00-18 200) in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  amending 
the implementing Regulation. the Commission will  consider the possible charging 
of such registration fees  On  the basis of :-umc  200 notifications a year, potential 
revenue  would  be  ECL;  l  200 OUO  (assuming  a  charge  of  ECU 6 000 
per  notification) 
7.  FIN:\1\CIAL IMPACT 
on  operating appropriations (Part  B) 
NONE - 3 -
8.  FRAUD PREVENTION MEASURES 
Specific control  measures envisaged 
9.  ELEMENTS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
I  Mergers that do  not have a Community dimension because they do not 
meet  the  current  threshold  criteria  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the 
Commission's responsibility and of  the one-stop-shop which operates under 
it.  Control  of such  mergers is  the  responsibility of the Member States. 
Of the fifteen Member States, eleven (soon twelve with the Netherlands) 
have domestic merger control  legislation.  Eight of the domestic merger 
control  legislations  have  a  system  of mandatory  prior notification.  In 
virtually all  the Member States (except Austria and the Netherla~ds), two 
public institutions are involved in the decision-making process. 
II  It should be emphasized that a merger may be subject to control by several 
national control authorities.  In its Green Paper, the Commission identified, 
over a -36-month  period,  100  or so cases in  which  there were multiple 
notifications involving at least two Member States, i.e.  33  cases a year. 
III  On  the basis of the estimates of additional  cases which the Commission 
believes would have to be dealt with if the thresholds were lowered, and 
which may be regarded as currently coming under national responsibility, 
it may be seen that: 
30 cases  of  so  involve  a  notification  m  one  Member State 
(two authorities) 
20 cases  or  so  involve  a  notification  m  two Member States 
(two authorities) 
10  cases  or  so  involve  a  notification  in  at  least  three 
Member States (two authorities) 
i.e.  a total  annual  workload for the Member States of 
(30 x 2) + (20 x 4) + (10 x 6) = 200 cases a year. 
Assuming a national  case-officer/notification ratio of six cases a year per 
case officer,  which  is  identical  to  the  Community  ratio  indicated  in 
section  10.1.111.12  of the financial  statement, this workload accounts for 
33  case officers throughout the Union. 
Consequently,  a  combined  reduction  in  thresholds  and  in  multiple 
notifications  will  bring  about  a  reduction  in  the  workload  within  the 
Union:  ·  33  case officers  wo~:~ld  be  relieved  of  their  tasks  in  the 
Member States;  18  case officers would be used for the same tasks by the 
Commission.  The cost-effectiveness analysis thus shows that the overall 
result would be positive. 
/b - 4 -
IV  Lastly, even if a lowering of the thresholds would mean that the national 
authorities would have to be involved in  a larger number of cases having 
a  Community  dimension  so  as  to  ensure  "close  and  constant  liaison" 
between  them  and  the  Commission,  it  should  be  noted  that,  in  90% of 
cases,  all  that will  be  required  is  that they  monitor the case and,  at the 
very most, express their comments. 
10.  ADMINISTRATIVE  EXPENDITURE  (part  A  of  Section  ill  of  the 
general budget) 
The actual mobilization of the necessary administrative resources will be a matter 
for  the  Commission's  annual  decision  on  the  allocation  of resources,  taking 
account in particular of any additional staff and amounts granted by the budgetary 
authority.  Additional  requirements will  at all  events be without prejudice to the 
decision which the Commission will  actually take on:  (a) requests for new posts 
within the framework of the preliminary draft budget, (b) allocation of resources. 
10.1  Impact on  the number of posts 
Type of posts  Staff to  be  allocated to  of which  duration 
administering the 
operation 
permanent  temporary  throt·gh  from  indefinite 
posts  posts  use of  additional 
existing  resources 
resources 
within the 
DG or 
department 
concerned 
Officials or  A  42  1  32  ll 
temporary  B  9  8  l 
agents  c  28  24  4 
Other r..:sources  16  13  3 
Total  79  17  77  19 
In the case of additional resources, indicate the rate at which they would have to be made 
available. 
Tmmediately  after the adoption  of the amendments to  the Merger Control  Regulatiun 
Assessment  of resources required 
lntroducto•·y remad< 
The Commission's proposals on  revising the Merger Control Regulation will increase the 
scope of Community control by  lowering the thresholds above which control applies and 
by  introducing  a  specific  procedure  for  mergers  notified  to  several  national  control 
authorities. - 5 -
Assessment of the number of additional  cases 
Under  the  proposal,  the  Commission  would  be  responsible  for  cases  above  the 
ECU 3 billion  and  ECU  ISO  million  thresholds,  and  below those thresholds  but above 
lower thresholds of ECU 2 billion and  ECU  100 million where the merger is notifiable 
to three national authorities.  The proposed thresholds are thus one third higher than the 
thresholds specified in the Green Paper, which would mean a corresponding reduction in 
the  number of cases,  i.e.  43  to  53  cases  a year.  To  this  should  be  added,  within  the 
ECU 3  to  2 billion  and  ECU  150  to  100 million  range,  merge~s notifiable  to  three 
national authorities, which would amount to only one third of·the estimates given in the 
Green Paper, i.e.  seven  to ten  cases a year. 
Consequently, under the proposal, the number of additional cases would amount to 50 to 
63  cases a year. 
Additional  staff requirements 
On  the basis of the above,  additional  staff requirements may  be estimated as  follows. 
The  method  used  involves the  establishment of a case-officer/notification  ratio  on  the 
basis of the situation in  1995, when  the  parameters were  as  follows:  114 notifications, 
seven second-stage cases and  28 case officers.  The ratio assumes that a first-stage case 
needs two case officers to work on it for one month and that a second-stage case requires 
four case officers for  five  months.  This gives the following calculation formula: 
(107 X  1 = 107) + [(7 X  5) X 2 = 70)  ..;- 28 = 6.32 
Consequently, a case officer is able to handle six  cases a year (stage II included), under 
present working conditions,  which  involve a very  sustained  pace of work. 
This gives the following estimates: 
Proposal  Additional  cases  Additional case officers 
Thresholds  50/63  8/ll 
On  the  basis  of these  estimates,  requirements  may  be  put  at:  10  A  case officers, 
1 B assistant,  4  C.  Provision must  be  made  for  one additional  Head  of Unit post to be 
responsible  for  the  additional  staff.  Account  must  also  be  taken  of the  additional 
requirements of  the associated departments (DG II, DG III, Legal  Service), with provision 
being made for a further three A posts.  The total  number of additional staff is estimated 
at  19. - 6 -
10.2  Overall  financial  impact of the additional  staff resources 
(ECU) 
Amounts  Calculation method 
Official sit em porary  1 600 000  ECU 100 000 per person per year 
agents  on the basis of recruitment of 
officials only 
Other resources (indicate 
budget heading) 
A-1520 Seconded 
national experts  120  000  SNE:  ECU 40  000  X  3 
(SNE) 
l  720 000 
Total 
These  amounts give  the  total cost of the  additional posts for the  total duration of the 
operation if  it is for a specified period, and  for 12 months if  it is for an indefinite period. 
10.3  Increase in  other operating expenditure resulting from  the operation 
(ECU) 
Budget heading  Amounts  Calculation method 
(n  - and heading) 
Total 
The  annual  amount  of other  operating  expenditure,  which  will  be  covered  by  the 
redeployment  of existing  resources,  is  estimated  at  ECU 300 000,  broken  down  as 
follows: 
AO 2 500 (meetings in  general) 
AO 2 510 (committee meetings) 
AO 352 (studies) 
ECU  100 000 5 additional meetings 
ECU  l 00 000 5 additional  meetings 
ECU  100 000 proposal  for a  %/ 0224(CNs, 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
no....  of .... 
amending Council  Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 
on  the control  of concentrations between undertakings 
THE  cottK: ll Of  THE  EUROPEAN  UN 1  ofi. 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
particular Articles 87  and  235  thereof, 
Having regard to  the proposal  from  the Commission, 
Having regard  to  the opinion of the European Parliament, 
Having regard  to  the opinion of the Economic and  Social  Committee, 
Community,  and  m 
Whereas it  should  be  possible for  the Council  acting  in  accordance with  Article  145  of the 
Treaty to  adjust the thresholds establishing the Community dimension of a concentration in 
order to ensure that concentrations with significant cross-border effects continue to be covered 
by  Community merger control; 
Whereas the  rules governing the  referral  of concentrations to  and  from  the  Member States 
must be reviewed at  the  same time as  the thresholds establishing the Community dimension 
of a concentration; whereas these rules protect the competition interests of the Member States 
in  an  adequate  manner  and  take  due  account  of legal  security  and  the  "one-stop  shop" 
principle; whereas, however, certain aspects of the referral procedures should be improved or 
clarified; 
Whereas.  in  particular,  the  Commission  can  declare  a concentration  incompatible with  the 
common market only if it impedes effective competition in a substantial part thereof; whereas, 
the  application  of national  competition  law  is,  therefore,  particularly  appropriate  where  a 
concentration affects competition on  a distinct market within  a Member State that does not 
constitute  a  substantial  part of the  common  market;  whereas  in  this  case it  should  not  be 
necessary to demonstrate, in  the request for referral, that the concentration threatens to create 
or to  strengthen a dominant position on  this distinct market; 
Whereas it should be expressly provided that two or more Member States may  make a joint 
request pursuant to  Article 22;  whereas to ensure effective control, provision should be made 
for  the  suspension  of concentrations  referred  to  the  Commission  by  one or more Member 
States; 
Whereas it is appropriate to define the concept of concentration in such a manner as to cover 
operations bringing about  a lasting  change  in  the  structure of the  undertakings concerned; whereas in the specific case of  joint ventures, it is appropriate to include within the scope and 
procedure of  Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89  all full-function joint ventures; whereas, 
in addition to the dominance test,  it must be provided that the Commission shall apply the 
criteria of Article 85  (1) and (3) of the Treaty to such joint ventures, to the extent that their 
creation results in an appreciable restriction of competition between undertakings that remain 
independent; whereas, if the effects of such joint ventures are primarily structural, it can be 
presumed that Article 85  (1) does not  apply;  whereas,  Article 85  (1)  may apply if two or 
more parent companies remain active in the market of the joint venture, or, if the creation of 
the  joint  venture  gives  rise  to  the  coordination  of the  parents'  activities  in  upstream, 
downstream or neighbouring markets; whereas, in this context, the appraisal of  all competition 
aspects of the creation of the joint venture must be made within the same procedure; 
Whereas,  for the  purposes of calculating the turnover of credit and  financial  institutions, 
banking income  is  a  better criterion  than  a  proportion of assets,  because  it  reflects  more 
accurately the economic reality of the whole banking sector; 
Whereas the Commission may declare a concentration compatible with the common market 
in  the second phase of the procedure, following modifications to the original concentration 
plan  that are proportional to and would entirely eliminate the competition problem; whereas, 
it is also appropriate to accept modifications to the concentration plan in the first phase of  the 
procedure where the competition problem is readily identifiable and can easily be remedied; 
whereas,  it should be expressly provided that in these cases the Commission may attach to 
its decision  conditions and  obligations;  whereas transparency  and effective consultation of 
Member States and interested third parties should be ensured in both phases of the procedure; 
Whereas to ensure effective control, concentrations should be suspended until a final  decision 
has  been taken;  whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  possible  to  waive a  suspension, 
where appropriate; whereas,  in  deciding whether or not to grant a waiver,  the Commission 
should take account of all  pertinent factors,  such as the nature and gravity of damage to the 
undertakings· concerned  or  to  third  parties,  and  the  threat  to  competition  posed  by  the 
concentration; 
Whereas it  should be expressly provided that decisions taken at the end of the first phase of 
the procedure cover restrictions directly  related  and  necessary  for  the implementation of a 
concentration; 
Whereas  it  should  be  possible  to  suspend  exceptionally  the  period  within  which  th~ 
Commission must take a decision within the first phase of the procedure; 
Whereas the Commission should be given the power to adopt implementing provisions where 
necessary, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
7..( ARTICLE 1
1 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 is hereby  amended as follows. 
1.  In  Article  1,  a new paragraph 5 is  inserted reading: 
"The  thresholds  laid  down  in  paragraphs  2 and  3 may  be  adjusted  by  the  Council 
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal  from  the Commission, in order to ensure 
that concentrations with significant cross-border effects continue to be covered by this 
Regulation." 
2.  In  Article 2,  a new  paragraph 4 is  inserted after paragraph 3 reading: 
"To the extent that the creation of a joint venture constituting a concentration pursuant 
to  Anicle 3 has  as  its  object or effect the  coordination of the competitive behaviour 
of undenakings  that  remain  independent,  such  coordination  shall  be  appraised  in 
accordance  with  the  criteria of Anicle 85  (1) and  (3) of the  Treaty,  with  a view to 
establishing whether or not  the  operation  is compatible with  the common  market." 
3.  In  Article  3,  paragraph 2 is  amended as  follows: 
a)  The first  subparagraph is  deleted. 
b)  The  phrase"which  does  not  give  rise  to  the  coordination  of the  competitive 
behaviour of the  parties  amongst  themselves  or  between  them  and  the joint 
venture"  is  deleted  from  the second  subparagraph. 
4.  In  Article  5,  paragraph 3 (a)  is  replaced  by  the following: 
''(a)  for  credit  institutions  and  other  financial  institutions,  as  regards  Articles 
1(2)(a),  1(2)(b),  1(3)a,  1(3)b and the final  parts of Article  1, paragraphs 2 and 
3, the sum of the following income items as defined in Directive 86/635/EEC: 
1.  interest income and  similar income; 
11.  income from  securities: 
- income from  shares and  other variable yield  securities; 
- income from  participating interests; 
- income from  shares in  affiliated undertakings; 
111.  commissions receivable; 
1v.  net  profit on  financial  operations; 
v.  other operating income. 
The  turnover of a credit  or  financial  institution  in  the  Community  or  in  a 
Member State shall  comprise  the  income items,  as  defined above,  which are 
When tlus proposal makes reference to  Articles of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 
21  December 1989,  it  should be  read  in  conjunction not only with the current text of this 
Regulation, but also with Commission proposal  no ...  of .... received  by  the  branch  or  division  of that  institution  established  tn  the 
Community or in  the Member State in  question,  as  the case may be. II 
5.  Article 6 
a)  In  paragraph  1,  a new sub-paragraph is  inserted after point (b) reading: 
"The  decision  declaring  the  concentration  compatible  shall  also  cover 
restrictions  directly  related  and  necessary  to  the  implementation  of  the 
concentration.  II 
b)  Paragraph  1 (c)  is  amended as  follows: 
"Without  prejudice  to  paragraph  2,  where  the  Commission  finds  that  the 
concentration  notified  falls  within  the  scope  of this  Regulation  and  raises 
serious doubts as to  its compatibility with the common market, it shall  decide 
to  initiate proceedings" 
c)  Paragraph 2 is  replaced  by  the following: 
"Where the Commission finds that, following modification by the undertakings 
concerned, a notified concentration no  longer raises serious doubts within the 
meaning  of  paragraph  I  (c).  it  may  decide  to  declare  the  concentration 
compatible with  the  common  market  pur~uant to  paragraph  l  (b). 
It  may  attach to  its  decision  unucr paragraph  I (b) conditions and  obligations 
intended  to  ensure  that  the  undertakings  concerned  comply  with  the 
commitments they  have entered  into vis-a-vis the Commission with a view to 
modifying the  original  concentration plan " 
d)  A new  paragraph  3 is  inserted  reading: 
"The Commission may  revoke the  decision it  has taken  pursuant to  paragraph 
I  (a)  or  (b) where 
(a 1  the  decision  is  based  on  incorrect  information  for  which  one  of the 
undet1akings is  responsible or where it  has been obtained by  deceit; or 
(b)  the  undenakings concerned commit a breach of an  obligation attached 
to  the  decision;  or 
(c)  the  coordination  of the  competitive  behaviour  of undertakings  that 
remain  independent,  \Vithin  the  meaning of Article 2(4),  affords such 
undertakings the possibility  of eliminating competition in  respect of a 
substantial  pa11  of the  products in  question." 
e)  A new  paragraph 4 is  inserted  reading 
"In  the cases referred  to  in  paragraph  3,  the Commission may  take a decision under paragraph 1, without being bound by the deadlines referred to in Article 
l 0( l ).  II 
f)  Former paragraph 2 becomes paragraph  5. 
6.  Article 7 
a)  Paragraph  1 is  amended as follows: 
"For the purposes of paragraph 2 a concentration as defined in  Article 1 shall 
not be put into effect either before its notification or until it has been declared 
compatible with the common market pursuant to a decision under Article 6 (I) 
(b) or Article 8 (2)  or on  the basis of a presumption according to  Article  10 
(6)." 
b)  Paragraph 2 is  deleted 
c)  Former paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 2 and  is  amended as  follows: 
The phrases "Paragraphs I and 2" at the beginning of the paragraph and "under 
paragraph  4"  at  the  end  of the  paragraph  are  replaced  by  the  phrases 
"Paragraph  I"  and  "under paragraph 3"  respectively. 
d)  former paragraph  4 becomes paragraph 3 and  is  amended as  follows: 
"The Commission  may,  on  request,  grant  a derogation  from  the  obligations 
imposed  in  paragraphs  I  or  2  The  request  to  grant  a  derogation  must  be 
reasoned.  In  deciding on  the request,  the Commission shall  take into account 
inter alia the effects of the suspension on one or more undertakings concerned 
by  a concentration or to  a third  party  and  the threat to  competition posed by 
the  concentration  That  derogation  may  be  made  subject  to  conditions  and 
obligations in order to ensure conditions of effective competition. A derogation 
may  be applied  for  and  granted at  any  time,  even  before notification or after 
the transaction " 
e)  Fonner paragraph  5 becomes paragraph 4 and  is  amended as  follows: 
The  phrase  "or  2"  is  deleted  from  the  first  and  the  last  sentence  of the 
paragraph. 
7  In  A11icle  8,  paragraph  5,  the following text is  inserted after point (b): 
"or; 
(c)  the  coordination  of the  competitive  behaviour  of undc11akings  that  remain 
independent, within the meaning of Article 2(4), affords such undertakings the 
possibility  of eliminating competition  in  respect  of a  substantial  part of the 
(1roducts  in  question'' 
7L. 8.  Article 9 
a)  Paragraph 2  is amended as follows: 
"Within three weeks of the  date of receipt of the copy of the notification a 
Member  State  may  inform  the  Commission,  which  shall  inform  the 
undertakings concerned, that 
(a)  a concentration threatens to create or to strengthen a dominant position 
as a result of which effective competition will be significantly impeded 
on  a  market  within  that  Member  State,  which  presents  all  the 
characteristics of a distinct market; or 
(b)  a  concentration affects competition on  a  market within that Member 
State,  which  presents  all  the characteristics of a  distinct market and 
which does not constitute a substantial part of the common market". 
b)  In  paragraph 3,  point (b) is  amended as follows: 
"(b)  it shall  refer the whole or part of the case to the competent authorities 
of the Member State concerned with a view to the application of that 
State's national competition law." 
c)  A  new sub-paragraph is  added at  the end of paragraph 3 reading: 
"In cases where a Member State informs the Commission that a concentration 
affects competition in a distinct market within its territory that does not form 
a substantial part of the common market, the Commission shall refer the whole 
or part of the case relating  to  the distinct market concerned, if it considers 
that such a distinct market is affected'' 
d)  Paragraph  10  is replaced by the following: 
"This Article will  be reviewed at the same time as the thresholds referred to 
in  Article I" 
9.  Article  I 0 
a)  In  paragraph  I,  the  following  text  is  added  at  the  end  of the  second  sub-
paragraph: 
"or where,  after  notification  of a  concentration,  the undertakings concerned 
propose modifications to the original concentration plan pursuant to Article 6 
(2), which are intended by the parties to form the basis for a decision pursuant 
to Article 6 (I) b.  " 
b)  The phrase "The period set by  paragraph 3"  at the beginning of paragraph 4 is replaced by the phrase "The periods set by paragraphs 1 and 3_". 
10.  Article 22 
a)  Paragraph 2 is amended as follows: 
"Regulations No  17,  (EEC) No  1017/68,  (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 
3975/87  shall  not apply  to  concentrations as  defined  in  Article 3,  with the 
exception of  joint ventures that do not have a Community dimension and have 
as  their  object  or  effect  the  coordination  of the  competitive  behaviour of 
undertakings that remain independent." 
b)  Paragraph 3 is amended as follows: 
"If the Commission  finds,  at  the  request of a  Member State or at the joint 
request  of two or more Member  States,  that a  concentration  as  defined  in 
Article 3 that has no Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 
creates  or  strengthens  a  dominant  position  as  a  result  of which  effective 
competition would be significantly impeded within the territory of  the Member 
State  or  the  States  making  the  joint  request,  it  may,  in  so  far  as  the 
concentration  affects  trade  between  Member  States,  adopt  the  decisions 
provided for in  Article 8(2),  second subparagraph, (3) and (4)." 
c)  Paragraph 4 is amended as follows: 
"Articles 2 (1) (a)  and  (b),  5,  6,  8  and  10  to 20  shall  apply.  Article 7 shall 
apply to the extent that the concentration has  not been put into effect on the 
date  on  which  the  Commission  informs the  parties  that a  request  has  been 
made. 
The period within which proceedings may be initiated pursuant to Article  10 
( 1)  shall begin on the day following that of the receipt of the request from the 
Member  State  or  States  concerned.  The  request  must be  made within  one 
month at most of the date on which the concentration was made known to the 
Member State or to all Member States making a joint request or effected. This 
period shall  begin on  the date of the first of those events." 
d)  In  paragraph 5,  the phrase "or States"  is inserted after the phrase "within the 
territory of the Member State". 
e)  Paragraph 6 is deleted. 
11.  In  Article 23: 
a)  The  phrase  "fees  for"  1s  inserted  after  the  phrase  "concerning  the  form, 
content,". 
b)  The phrase "time limits pursuant to Article 10" is replaced by the phrase "time limits pursuant to  Articles 7,  9,  10  and  22,  paragraphs 3-5". 
c)  A new subparagraph is  inserted  reading: 
"The Commission  shall  have the  power to  lay  down  the procedure and  time 
limits for submitting modifications to a notified concentration plan pursuant to 
Articles 6 (2) and  8(2)." 
ARTICLE 2 
This Regulation shall  enter into force  on ... 
ARTICLE 3 
This Regulation shall  not apply to any  concentration which  was the subject of an  agreement 
or announcement or where control  was acquired within  the  meaning of Article 4 (1) before 
the date of this Regulation's entry into force and  it shall not in any circumstances apply to any 
concentration  in  respect of which  proceedings were  initiated before that date by  a Member 
State's authority with  responsibility for  competition. 
This Regulation shall be  binding in  its entirety and  directly  applicable in  all  Member States. FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
(Proposal 2) 
IV/905/96-EN 
A  financial  statement, the model  for which follows,  must accompany any Commission 
proposal  or communication to the  Council  that is  likely  to have  implications for the 
budget, including implications in terms of the number of posts (Article 3 of the Financial 
Regulation).  At least ten working days must normally be allowed for DG XIX's opinion 
and for the opinion of DG IX (on section  10 "Administrative expenditure").  An opinion 
will be given only if all  the questions are answered. 
The same information, updated for  operations already  under way,  must be supplied in 
support  of requests  for  appropriations  when  the  preliminary  draft  budget  is  being 
prepared.  The information  to  be  supplied  may  vary  in  certain  cases.  The particular 
financial  statement to be used in such cases is specified in the annual budgetary circular. 
The numbered sections must be completed.  The notes in  italics suggest various possible 
answers.  It is  up  to  the  department  to  present  as  clearly  and  fully  as  possible  the 
information  it  is  submitting in  support of its  request for  appropriations or estimate of 
future  requirements.  The  notes  in  italics  should  therefore  be  deleted· when  the 
department's text is inserted - 2 -
Financial statement 
1.  TITLE OF OPERATION:  Review of Council  Regulation No 4064/89 on  the 
control of concentrations between undertakings 
2.  BUDGET HEADING(S) INVOLVED 
Part A (see section  I 0) 
3.  LEGAL BASIS: Articles 87 and 235 of the Treaty on European Union 
4.  DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION: 
4.1  General  objective:  to  extend  the  scope  of merger  control  applying  to 
undertakings having a Community dimension 
4.2  Period covered and arrangements for renewal. 
No time-limit 
5.  CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE OR REVENUE 
5.1  Non-compulsory expenditure 
5.2  Non-differentiated appropriations 
5.3  Type of revenue involved. 
6.  TYPE OF EXPENDITURE OR REVENUE 
Administrative expenditure (see section  I 0) 
Will the proposed operation cause any change in the level of revenue?  If 
so,  what sort of change and  what type of revenue is involved? 
In  contrast  to  some  Member States  (Germany,  the  United Kingdom),  the 
Commission has not hitherto charged any registration fee or levied any other type 
of charge for notifications lodged by firms.  By way of comparison, such fees and 
charges  amount  to  DM  12  000-15 000  (ECU 6 400-8 020)  in  Germany  and 
UKL 5 000-15 000 (ECU 6  100-18 200) in  the United Kingdom.  In  amending 
the implementing Regulation, the Commission will consider the possible charging 
of such registration fees.  On  the basis of some 200 notifications a year, potential 
revenue  would  be  ECU 1 200 000  (assuming  a  charge  of  ECU 6 000 
per notification). 
7.  FINANCIAL IMPACT 
on  operating app1opriations (Part B) 
NONE 
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8.  FRAUD PREVENTION MEASURES 
Specific control  measures envisaged 
9.  ELEMENTS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
10.  ADMINISTRATIVE  EXPENDITURE  (part  A  of  Section  ill  of  the 
general budget) 
The actual mobilization of the necessary administrative resources will be a matter 
for  the  Commission's  annual  decision  on  the  allocation  of resources,  taking 
account in particular of any additional staff and amounts granted by the budgetary 
authority.  Additional requirements will  at all  events be without prejudice to the 
decision which the Commission will  actually take on:  (a) requests for new posts 
within the framework of the preliminary draft budget, (b) allocation of resources. 
10.1  Impact on the number of posts 
Type of posts  Staff to be allocated to·  of which  duration 
administering the 
operation 
permanent  temporary  through  from  indefinite 
posts  posts  use of  additional 
existing  resources 
resources 
within the 
DG or 
department 
concerned 
Officials or  A  35  1  32  4 
temporary  B  9  8  l 
agents  c  26  24  2 
Other resources  15  l3  2 
Total  70  16  77  9 
In the case of additional resources, indicate the rate at which they would have to be made 
available. 
Immediately after the adoption of the amendments to the Merger Control Regulation. 
Assessment of resources required 
Introductory remark 
The draft redefinition of the tem1  "concentration" as applicable to joint ventures would 
have  the  effoct  of extending  the  scope  of the  Regulation  to  include  a  number  of 
operations which at present are not covered by  it. - 4  -
Assessment of the number of additional  cases 
The Green Paper does not contain any statistics on the impact of amending the definition 
of concentrative joint venture.  On  the basis of the statistics available to DG IV,  i.e.  the 
number  of  structural  cooperative  JOIDt  ventures  currently .  notified  under 
Regulation No  17/62 (accelerated procedure)  which  would  fall  within the scope of the 
amended Merger Regulation,  the  number of additional  cases may  be put at between 20 
and  30  a year. 
Additional  staff requirements 
On  the basis of the above,  additional  staff requirements may  be estimated as follows. 
The  method  used  involves  the  establishment of a case-officer/notification  ratio  on  the 
basis of the situation  in  1995,  when the  parameters were as  follows:  1I4 notifications, 
seven second-stage cases and  28  case officers.  The ratio assumes that a first-stage case 
needs tWo case officers to work on it for one month and that a second-stage case requires 
four case officers for  tive months.  This gives the  following calculation formula: 
[107 X  I = I07] + [(7  X  5)  X  2 = 70]  7  28  = 6.32 
Consequently, a case officer is able to  handle six  cases a year (stage II  included), under 
present working conditions,  which  involve a very  sustained  pace of work. 
This gives the following estimates: 
Proposal  Additional  cases  Additional case officers 
Concentrative JV s  20/30  4/5 
On  the  basis  of these  estimates,  requirements  may  be  put  at:  4 A  case officers, 
I  B assistant.  2 C.  Provision must be  made  for  one additional  Head of Unit post to be 
responsible  for  the  additional  staff.  Account -must  also  be  taken  of the  additional 
requirements of  the associated departments (DG II, DG III, Legal  Service), with provision 
being made for  one further A post.  The  total  number of additional  staff is estimated at 
9. 
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10.2  Overall  financial  impact of the additional  staff resources 
(ECU) 
Amounts  Calculation method 
Officials/temporary  700 000  ECU 100 000 per person per year 
agents  on the basis of recruitment of 
officials only 
Other resources (indicate 
budget heading) 
A-1520 Seconded 
national  experts  80 000  SNE:  ECU 40 000 x  2 
(SNE) 
780 000 
Total 
lhese  £111/0IIIIts  gm.:  tilL'  total cost  r~/the additio11ul posts for  the  total duration of the 
opeJ'([{irm if  it is fur a .'fJI.!CI/ied period. undfor 12  months~(  it isfor all indefinite period. 
10 3  Increase in  other operating expenditure resulting from  the operation 
(ECU) 
Budget heading  Amounts  Calculation  method 
(n  - and  heading) 
Total 
The  annual  amm;nt  of  other  operating  expenditure,  \vhich  will  be  covered  by  the 
redeployment  of existing  resuurces.  is  estimated  at  ECU 300 000,  broken  down  as 
follows: 
AO 2 500 (meetings in  general) 
:\.0 2 510  (committee meetings) 
AO 352 (studies) 
• 
ECU  I UO  000 5 additional  meetings 
ECU  I  UO  000 5 additional  meetings 
ECU  I 00  UOO RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATION ON  THE COMMISSION'S 
GREEN PAPER ON THE REVIEW OF THE MERGER REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
On  31  January,  after having consulted  the  Community  institutions, the  Member States, 
industry and the legal profession, the Commission published a Green Paper on the review 
of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EEC) No  4064/89 of 21  December 1989) 
and  put forward,  for  discussion  by  the  parties concerned,  an  overall  assessment of the 
application of the Merger Regulation and  a range of proposals or amendment options. 
In  the  Green Paper,  the  Commission  asked  all  interested  parties  to  submit  their 
observations and  comments by  3 I March 
The  Commission  has  received  contributions  from  the  Member States  ( 15), 
1  industry 
federations or associations (30), law firms  ( 16) and,  to  a very  limited extent, individual 
companies (I 0), the latter having already been involved in the preliminary survey in  1995 
which  preceded the drafting of the Green  Paper. 
Such contributions were the subject of further discussion and  were taken into account in 
the Commission's work 
This  document  summarizes  the  results  of the  consultation  on  the  Green  Paper  and 
concentrates  on  a  number  of main  points  threshold  reduction,  multiple  notifications, 
joint ventures and the turnover of banks  It  rep011s only  on  the opinions put forward by 
the industry  federations or  associations and  by  Member States.  The limited number of 
replies from  law firms or individual companies does not allow sufficiently representative 
conclusions to be  dra\vn  as  far  as  they  are  concerned 
l.  THRESHOLD REDL'CTION 
As  far  as  the  level  of thresholds  is  concerned,  a  maJonty  (63%)  of  the  industry 
federations and  associations was  in  favour  of the  current  level  being lowered,  and  half 
of them  backed  the  thresholds  proposed  in  the  Green  Paper.  The  federations  or 
associations that were in  favour of maintaining, or indeed raising, the thresholds were in 
a  clear  minority  (26°,-Q)  and  were  mostly  from  the· financial  sector  or  the  distributive 
trades 
The Member States haYc so far e\prcssed preliminary views through their national merger control 
authorities. at  the  multilateral  meeting bet\\ ccn  national and Con1nnmity  experts. - 2 -
The Member States were divided in their views on this point.  Seven Member States were 
in favour of lowering the thresholds (B-GR-FI-NL-IT-P-LUX), while, amongst the eight 
others, three were firmly  opposed and  five expressed varying degrees of reservation. 
A very large majority (70%) of the industry federations and associations did not express 
any direct view on the two-thirds rule.  Of those which did express a view, opinions were 
fairly  evenly  divided (16.6% for  maintaining the  rule,  13.3% against maintaining it). 
By contrast, virtually all  the Member States were in favour of maintaining the two-thirds 
rule, which they considered satisfactory as regards the principle of the sharing of powers 
between the Commission and the Member States. 
2.  MULTIPLE NOTIFICATIONS 
As regards notifications to the national supervisory authorities, the majority (73%) of the 
federations  and  associations  took the  view that  multiple notifications  posed  a problem 
which  should  be  ~olved by  extending the  Commission's exclusive powers,  on  the basis 
of a simple and practical procedure.  The comments made by the industry federations and 
associations vary  as  to the  details of the  arrangements to  be  introduced.  However,  six 
of them were in favour of introducing an optional system for firms,  while eight expressed 
their view on the number of national authorities that should be involved, with six of them 
(i.e.  75% of the  relevant replies) considering that the  minimum  number required should 
be  three. 
Amongst  the  Member States,  the  great  maJonty  (86%)  considered  that  multiple 
notifications  posed  a real  difficulty  for  firms  and  that  a simple  and  practical  solution 
should  be  sought.  Amongst  the  Member States  expressing  a view  on  the  number of 
authorities  that  should  be  involved,  three  (or  more)  was  the  figure  most  frequently 
suggested.  Similarly, most of the Member States consider that this new procedure should 
be  compulsory  for  fmns.  Some  Member States  identified  a  number  of practical  or 
procedural difficulties, notably where one of the merger control  thresholds is established 
on  the basis of market shares. 
3.  JOINT VENTURES 
The majority of the industry  federations and  associations (70%) were sharply critical of 
the differential treatment of joint ventures and called for a rapid solution to be found for 
this  problem  Of the  21  federations  which  commented,  nine  (  42%)  chose  group I 
procedural solutions, without any marked preference emerging between the three options. 
A total  of 12  federations  chose group  II  options  combining  procedural  and  substantive 
solutions.  Of those which  expressed a preference,  five  were in  favour of option Ila and 
four  in  favour of option lib. 
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Amongst  the  Member States,  views  on  the  options  presented  are  divided.  Four 
Member States did  not express any definitive preference.  Ofthe eleven others, six were 
in favour of the procedural solutions, with a clear preference for option lb, and four were 
in  favour of the procedural  and  substantive solutions. 
4.  TURNOVER  CALCULATION  FOR  CREDIT  AND  FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Given the highly  specific nature of the question asked,  there were few reactions. 
Amongst  the  seven  federations  or  associations  which  replied,  six  were  in  favour  of 
changing the current calculation method and of referring to banking income.  A majority 
was  in  favour of net banking income. 
Of the Member States which,  at  this  stage,  have expressed a view on  the subject,  three 
were in favour of switching to banking income, while three others argued that the present 
system  should  be maintained. 
5.  OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION 
There is very  broad agreement amongst the business federations and associations that an 
express legal  basis should be established for the acceptance of Phase I commitments. Of 
the  IS  federations which  replied  on  this  point,  14  were in  favour of such  a provision. 
The Member States were all  in  favour of introducing an  express legal basis for accepting 
Phase I  commitments,  particularly  if  provision  is  made  for  consultation  of  the 
Member States and third parties  Several Member States emphasized that the acceptance 
of Phase  I commitments should remain  limited to  the  present conditions. 
As far as the referral arrangements are concerned, the federations or associations showed 
limited  interest  (nine  explicit  replies).  The  great  majority  (88%)  of those  which  did 
express a view on  this question supported the maintenance of the present system, subject 
to the slight amendments proposed in  the Green Paper.  Only one reply argued that, if the 
thresholds were lowered,  Article 9 should  be  broadened. - 4 -
The great majority of the Member States, with the notable exception of Germany, stated 
that they were satisfied with the current provisions and practice regarding referral.  They 
therefore  welcomed  the  comments  in  the  Green  Paper on  this  point,  as  regards  both 
Article 9 and Article 22, for which a number of procedural adjustments were proposed. MERGER REVIEW 
COMMENTS ON THE GREEN PAPER BY ASSOCIATIONS 
1.  Thresholjs 
2.  Multiple national filings 
3.  Joint ventures 
4.  Other issues 
Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers 
1.  In favour of lowering thresholds as  suggested by the Commission. 
2.  Supports a practical solution for multiple national filings. 
lndustriellenvereinigung bsterreichs 
1.  In favour of the proposed threshold reduction. 
2.  The 2/3-rule should be dropped in  cases,  where multiple notification in  more 
than 2 member states is necessary. In cases of multiple notifications it should 
always  be  possible  to  apply for  the  Commission's  competence,  even  if the 
proposed thresholds are not met (except for de minimis-cases). 
3.  Joint  ventures:  Extend  Article  3  (2)  of MR to  .ill[ joint ventures,  whether full 
function or not,  except shams (cartels dressed up as joint ventures) (=option 
lib). 
4.  In favour of an express legal basis for the acceptance of commitments in first 
phase.  In  favour of the proposal for ancillary restraints in  the first phase and 
for more flexibility in  the application of Article 7.  Agrees that Article 9 should 
not be enlarged in  a manner that endangers the one-stop shop principle.  In 
favour  of  proposed  amendments  of  Article  22,  except  for  the  proposed 
suspension of concentrations examined under this Article. 
British Retail Consortium 
1.  Against  a  reduction  of  thresholds,  as  far  as  the  retail  sector is  concerned. 
Would instead like to  raise thresholds in  the  retail sector. 
2.  Under system for multiple national filings, application to the Commission should 
be voluntary. 
3.  Not aware of problems arising from  current practice on Joint Ventures, but in 
favour of option lc. 4.  In favour of an express legal basis for the acceptance of commitments in first· 
phase. 
Irish Business and Employers Association 
1.  Supports the Commission's proposal to lower thresholds. 
2.  Also  supports  proposal  that  multiple  national  filings  for  mergers  below 
thresholds should come within the exclusive competence of the Commission. 
3.  Supports procedural improvements in  the treatment of joint ventures. 
4.  Supports acceptance of commitments in  the first phase of investigation. 
Federation bancaire de I'Union Europeenne 
1.  Against a threshold reduction 
2.  Would favour a proposal extending Community competence for mergers : 
above lower thresholds of ECU 2 b and  100 m; 
involving three or more national authorities. 
4  In favour of net banking income as the basis for the calculation of turnover for 
banks. 
Wirtschaftskammer bsterreich 
1.  In favour of a threshold reduction, except for banks and assurances. The 2/3-
rule  should be kept 
2.  Not every concentration subject to two multiple national filings has automatically 
a Community-wide dimension. The national systems should be harmonised. 
3.  Joint  ventures:  improve the  procedure applicable to  cooperative full-function 
jo1nt  ventures. 
4.  In  favour  of net  banking  income as  the  basis for calculating the turnover of 
credit and f1nancial  inst1tutions. 
Bundesverband der Deutschen lndustrie 
1.  In favour of the proposed threshold reduction. Moreover, the 2/3-rule should be 
droppel!l. 
31 2.  As a "second best" solution, concentrations subject to  multiple national filings 
should be dealt with at Community level.  Member States should decide as to 
the application of their national law;  if there is no opposition within a specified 
time period, the national law should be deemed to  apply. 
3.  Joint ventures: Apply the procedure and substantive test of the MR to all joint 
ventures, whether full function or not, except shams (cartels dressed up as joint 
ventures) (=option lib).  However, a solution must be found so that cooperative 
joint ventures below the thresholds can benefit from  the "one-stop shop" 
4.  In  favour  of express  legal  basis  for the  acceptance of commitments  in  first 
phase.  In  favour of proposed  amendment of Article  9,  no further changes 
should be made to the referral rules under this Article. 
Centre Europeen des Entreprises a participation publique 
1.  A  lowering  of the  current  thresholds  is  not justified;  the  2/3-rule  should  be 
maintained. 
2.  Would  favour  a  procedure  whereby  companies  would  be  able  to  choose 
between the Community "one-stop shop" and the different national authorities. 
This possibility could be  provided by Article 22. 
3.  Considers that the best approach  is  a procedural one and prefers options Ia 
and  lb. 
4.  Expresses  some  doubts  about the  proposal  concerning  the  simplification of 
Article 9 for cases affecting a non  substantial part of the common market. 
Expresses doubts about the acceptance of commitments in  the first phase of 
examination.  Is  against the harmonization of the suspension period.  Asks for 
the  introduction of new criteria for the assessment of cases. 
Federation des Entreprises de Belgique 
1.  Proposes an  alternative solution:  between ECU  5 b and  2 b and  250 m and 
100m., companies would have the choice to  notify either to the Commission 
or to  one or several national authorities. 
3.  Prefers the "substantive and procedural" options lla or Jib. 
4.  Favours an express legal basis for the acceptance of commitments in the first 
phase (maximum extension of first phase by two weeks). 
3 Confederation of British Industry 
1.  In favour of the reduction suggested by the Commission, and maintenance of 
the 2/3-rule. 
2.  In the event that the thresholds are not lowered, the CBI supports a solution for 
multiple  national  notifications  as  suggested  by  the  Commission.  A  special 
procedure for multiple national filings  should be triggered when two or more 
national  authorities  are  involved.  Voluntary  notification  systems  should  be 
included.  Prefers an  optional system for multiple national filings. 
3.  The majority of the respondents supports Option II a  .. 
4.  Supports the Commission proposals relating to Articles 9 and 22.  In favour of 
giving the Commission express powers to accept and enforce commitments in 
first phase.  In favour of the other "housekeeping amendments". 
Supports the banking income criterion. 
European Public Telecommunications Network Operators' Association 
1.  Supports reduction of thresholds. 
2.  If overall thresholds are not reduced, ETNO is in favour of extending exclusive 
Community competence at  least for multiple national filings. 
3.  Supports the proposal to harmonise the assessment procedures of cooperative 
and concentrative joint ventures. In favour of extending the scope of the Merger 
Regulation to  all  cases of structural cooperative joint ventures. 
4.  Regrets  the  absence  of  an  automatic  exemption  for  "de  minimis"  cases. 
Favours  express  legal  basis  for  commitments  in  first  phase  (maximum 
extension of first phase by two weeks).  Asks for the introduction of new criteria 
for the assessment of cases. 
Centre National du Patronat Fran<;ais 
1.  The majority is not in  favour of a lowering of the current thresholds. 
2.  The majority is  in  favour of giving the  Commission exclusive competence for 
mergers : 
above lower thresholds of 2 b and  1  00 m 
where at least three national authorities are  involved 
a two week period  for Member States to  decide on  the  application of 
·national law 
an  opposition procedure for Member States. 
4 3.  Thinks that the best option would be option II a of the Green Paper.  In addition, 
it is in favour of a new implementing regulation for partial-function cooperative 
joint-ventures in order to ensure legal certainty and speed of decision making. 
4.  Wants Articles 9 and 22  to  be maintained in  their current form.  Favours an 
express legal basis for commitments in first phase proceedings (no extension 
of the one month period).  Supports the net banking income criterion.  Regrets 
the absence of a specific proposal for "de minimis" operations. 
Deutscher lndustrie- und Handelstag 
1.  In  favour of the proposed threshold reduction to  ECU  2 billion and ECU  100 
million. The 2/3-rule should be dropped or replaced by a 3/4-rule. 
2.  As  a "second best," concentrations subject to  multiple filings should be dealt 
with at Community level,  provided that a workable system can be found. 
3.  Joint ventures:  Create new procedures for the  treatment of cooperative full-
function  joint ventures  by  means  of  a  new  Regulation,  in  order to  simplify 
procedures and  provide for fast decisions and  legal certainty (=option Ia)  or 
make cooperative full-function joint ventures subject to procedures of the MR, 
leaving the two substantive tests separate (=option  lb). 
4  In  favour  of express  legal  basis  for the  acceptance  of commitments  in  first 
phase and of the proposed improvements 1n  the referral procedures (Articles 
9 and 22). 
Association des Grandes Entreprises Franc;aises 
1.  The majority of the AGREF members is in favour of a lowering of the thresholds 
to  E  C  U 2 b and 1  00 m. 
' 
2.  A  possible solution for AGREF would be the following : 
lower threshold levels of 2 b and  100 m 
voluntary notification to the Commission between the current thresholds 
and these lower thresholds. 
Another solution could be found  by means of Article 22. 
3.  AGREF thinks that the best option would be  lla. 
4.  Article  9  should  be  maintained  in  its  current  form.  Agrees  with  the 
Commission's proposal concerning a joint request under Article 22.  Favours 
an express legal basis for commitments in first phase.  Favours the net banking 
income criterion. 
5 International Chamber of Commerce 
1.  The great majority of ICC members supports the reduction of the thresholds as 
suggested by the Commission. 
2.  Supports the Commission's proposal regarding multiple notifications when two 
national  authorities,  based  either on  mandatory or on  voluntary notification, 
have jurisdiction over a concentration.  Agrees with lower thresholds of 2b and 
100m. 
3.  The ICC  supports option lib.  As  a second best choice option  lla. 
4.  The ICC  suggests that "de minimis" operations should be excluded from  the 
scope of the EMCR.  Favours an express legal basis for commitments in first 
phase. 
Verband der Versicherungsunternehmen Osterreichs 
1.  In favour of the proposed threshold reduction.  The 2/3-rule should be kept. 
2.  Concentrations subject  to  multiple filings  should  be  dealt with  a Community 
level,  at the request of the undertakings involved. 
3.  Joint ventures:  In favour of harmonized treatment,  in particular with regard to 
the procedural aspects. 
4.  In  favour  of express  legal  basis  for  the  acceptance  of commitments  in  first 
phase. 
Union Espanola de Entidades Aseguradoras 
1.  The  UNESPA  members  favour  either  a  status  quo  or  a  reduction  of the 
thresholds to  3b  and 200m.  The  majority of UNESPA ask for a 3/4-rule. 
Federation Franc;aise des Societes d'Assurances 
1.  Not in favour of a lowering of the  current thresholds. 
2.  In favour of giving the  Commission exclusive competence for mergers below 
the curent thresholds where at least three national authorities involved.  It would 
like  the  introduction  of  a  pre-notification  procedure  to  determine  the 
Commission's competence. 
4.  It  wants  Article  9  to  be  maintained  in  its  current  form.  Asks  for  special 
6 provisions for "de  minimis" joint ventures.  Asks for clarification concerning 
Article 5,  especially for the insurance sector. 
Associazione Nazionale fra le lmprese Assicuratrici 
1.  Supports an extension of the Commission's exclusive competence in line with 
the one-stop shop principle,  either by means of a reduction of the thresholds 
or by means of a procedure for multiple notifications. 
British Insurers' International Committee 
1.  In favour of a reduction of thresholds in the context of mergers involving more 
than one country. 
2.  In favour of giving the Commission jurisdiction over mergers involving multiple 
national filings. 
3.  Concerning joint ventures,  it  supports either option lla or lib. 
Confindustria 
1.  Favourable to the Commission's proposal to reduce the current thresholds.  As 
an  alternative it suggests a progressive lowering of the thresholds. 
~·  Concerning joint ventures,  supports option  Ia. 
Chambre de Commerce et d'lndustrie de Paris 
1.  Wishes to maintain the current thresholds. At the same time, however, asks for 
a harmonization of the concept of control under national legislation by means 
of a directive. 
4.  Supports the introduction of a legal basis for commitments in first phase.  Asks 
for the introduction of new criteria  in  the assessment of cases. 
The Dutch Employers'  Association 
1.  Favours a reduction of the thresholds. 
2.  Considers  multiple  national  notification  as  a problem.Supports  the following 
solutions: 
two national authorities involved 
compulsory  notification  to  the  Commission  only  if  the  two  national 
authorities involved have a compulsory system of notification. Otherwise 
7 companies should be able to choose. 
3.  Favours option lla. 
Conseil Europeen de l'industrie Chimique 
1.  Supports the Commission's proposal to  lower thresholds. 
Concerning joint ventures,  supports  any  proposal  which  would  bring  about 
similar conditions and procedures for all kinds of joint ventures. 
Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales (views of 1995) 
1.  Favours a reduction of the thresholds as suggested by the Commission. 
UNICE 
1.  A clear majority of UNICE's member federations  supports a reduction of the 
thresholds  to  ECU  2b  and  100  m.  Nearly  all  member  federations  support  • 
maintenance  of  the  2/3-rule.  Moreover,  UNICE  fully  agrees  with  the 
Commission on the  benefits to  business of the one-stop shop. 
2.  In  the  event  that  the  thresholds  are  not  lowered,  the  majority  of UNICE's 
member federations believe that  a special procedure for dealing with multiple 
notification. should  be  triggered when  notification  is  required  in  two  or more 
Member States.  Voluntary systems should be included. Member States should 
have one week to  decide on their jurisdiction. 
The  companies  involved  should  have  the  0ption  of  notifying  either  the 
Commission or the relevant national authorities. 
3.  The  majority  of UNICE's  member federations  supports  option  lb.  However, 
there is  also a significant support for option lla.  Urgent need to  improve the 
current situation. 
4.  Requests a simplified procedure for "de minimis" cases.  Supports an express 
legal basis for commitments in first phase. 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Athens 
1.  Wishes  to  maintain  the  current  thresholds  and  to  establish  specific  higher 
thresholds  for  commercial  companies.  However,  should  a  reduction  be 
necessary,  then Article 9 should  be  enlarged.  As  to  the solution for multiple 
national filings,  it  must be  ensured that it will not raise practical difficulties. 
8 3.  Prefers option lb for the treatment of joint ventures  .. 
The American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (The EU  Committee) 
1.  Supports lowering of the thresholds (2  b and 100 m). 
2.  Supports  EC  jurisdiction  in  case  of  two  or  more  national  filings.  As  an 
alternative solution,  1t  proposes a threshold reduction to  ECU 2b and 100m, 
combined with a change of the two-thirds rule into a rule based on some lower 
percentage. 
3.  In  favour of option lla. 
4.  Supports the proposal to  use gross banking income. 
FEMGED  (Federation Europeenne des Moyennes et Grandes Entreprises de 
Distribution) 
1  Aga1nst  the lowenng of the thresholds 
Groupement Europeen des Caisses d'Epargne 
1.  Expresses an interest in the lower1ng of thresholds as a means for avoiding the 
need for multiple nat1onal f1l1ngs  Harmonisation of national systems of control 
would also be des1r2ble 
2  The Commission's "second best" solut1on would also avoid the need for multiple 
nat1onal  f1l1ngs.  but  should  be  considered whether when a minimum  of three 
Member States  must affected  before  the  Community-wide  significance of a 
merger can aff1rmed 
4  Wants  the  current  critenon  for  the  calculation  of  turnover  for  banks  to  be 
ma1ntained 
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